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Résumé  :  La  France  est  sortie  blessée  des  années  noires  de  la  deuxième  guerre 
mondiale, mais sa reconstruction présente un exemple des plus réussis de la gestion 
des conséquences de la guerre. Cet article examine le processus de bricolage par lequel 
les élites françaises ont conduit un programme urgent de construction national, dans 
lequel la reconstruction culturelle et intellectuelle a joué un rôle de pointe. La synthèse 
nationale qui en résulte a subordonné les exigences d’autres identités, et notamment 
celles de classe et de genre, aux forces dominantes de la société nationale. Le consensus 
puissant qu’il fallait reconstruire une nouvelle identité nationale pendant les années 
1944-1947 a contribué à assurer l’avenir d’une France d’après-guerre libre et prospère. 
Le succès de cette reconstruction nationale pourrait offrir des leçons pour d’autres 
pays de nos jours, où des élites nationales assiégées font face à la tache stratégique de 
reconstruire une nation après le conflit et le changement de régime.
Mots  clés  :  France,  Seconde  guerre  mondiale,  Libération,  construction  nationale, 
identité nationale, langage, culture, dominance, bricolage.
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War and culture : The lessons of post-war France
Summary : France emerged wounded from the dark days of the Second World 
War but the rebuilding of France offers one of the most successful examples 
of  managing  the  aftermath  of  war.  This  article  examines  the  process  of 
‘bricolage’ through which the French elites carried out an urgent programme 
of nation building, with the cultural and intellectual rebuilding of French 
national  identity  playing  a  key  role.  The  emerging  national  synthesis 
subordinated  the  demands  of  other  identities,  especially  those  of  class 
and gender, to the dominant forces in the national society. The powerful 
consensus to rebuild a new national identity in 1944-7 helped to secure the 
future for a free and prosperous post-war France. The success with which 
they rebuilt their nation may hold lessons for other countries in the present 
day, where embattled national elites confront the strategic task of building 
or rebuilding a nation after conflict and regime change. 92
Learning from the past
Learning from our own past is difficult: it is one of the benefits of neighbours that we 
can learn from theirs. France is Britain’s nearest continental neighbour, and part 
of the fascination of France for a British observer is that its history holds endlessly 
instructive lessons for us. In many cases, the examples we take are drawn from 
the most turbulent episodes in French history, and there is always a temptation 
to be glad that Britain has escaped some of the travails that have afflicted our 
neighbour. All the more reason, then, to look at the occasions on which France 
has successfully overcome the difficult moments it has faced. The rebuilding of 
France after the Second World War is a remarkable example of how our neighbour 
rose to the challenge of emerging into the sunshine of peace and prosperity
after the dark years of the war.  And with very little imagination, the reconstruction 
of post-war France can be seen to offer lessons that might illuminate some of 
the darker regions in the twenty-first century world.1
Europe in the early twenty-first century has rediscovered war and its aftermaths. 
More than at any time in the last forty years, European governments have been 
obliged to confront war on their home territory, though not always in the forms 
in which it became familiar in the mid-twentieth century. As a result, they have 
once more been obliged to engage, willingly or not, with the consequences of 
wars in far away places. Conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan and the heart of Africa 
have absorbed increasing resources abroad and have brought their implications 
home. In the context of asymmetrical warfare and ‘soft power’, it has become 
evident that culture is a more unforgiving battlefield than the deserts and 
mountains of Asia.
Cultural struggle and the battle for minds were familiar to an earlier generation, 
and the importance of these domains in winning wars has frequently been 
studied. Less attention has been devoted to the role of culture in managing 
the aftermath of wars, though it is a recurrent theme of political strategists, as 
distinct from military strategists, that winning the peace is at least as important 
as winning the war. These are not new issues, then, and it is one of the tasks of 
researchers in the domain of culture to remind a contemporary audience that 
there may be lessons to be learnt from the past. 
In recent French history, a dominant role has been assumed by the study of 
the  Second  World  War  with  its  narratives  of  heroism  and  cowardice,  hope 
and despair. This has largely overshadowed the more muted narratives of the 
aftermath of that war, once the great days of Liberation had passed. And yet 
the rebuilding of France must rank as one of the most successful examples of 
managing the aftermath of war, and certainly has light to shed for those who 
are grappling with more recent attempts at post-war reconstruction. Here we 
shall seek to identify some of the factors contributing to that success, and point 
to some of the costs which were incurred in achieving it.
National unanimity
The  French  post-war  elites  demonstrated  a  remarkable  unanimity  on  one 
central point: the need to rebuild their nation. This unanimity was captured 
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in the euphoria of the moment of liberation, especially the heavily symbolic 
liberation of the French capital. It gave many French people the feeling of a 
brilliant moment that could never be taken from them. As Simone de Beauvoir 
wrote: ‘quoi qu’il arrivât après, rien ne m’arracherait ces instants: rien ne me 
les a arrachés; ils brillent dans mon passé avec un éclat qui ne s’est jamais 
démenti.’2 Later accounts have then focused on the difficulties that began 
almost immediately, and the rapid onset of disillusionment and disagreement.3 
There was no shortage of divisions among the French elites, as among the 
French  people  more  generally.  But  there  was  fundamental  agreement  that 
France should be a single, united, sovereign and independent nation. All other 
disagreements, however vehement, were secondary to this. The consensus was 
made more achievable by the radical pruning the elites had undergone, with 
a significant part of the political spectrum excluded by virtue of their poor 
wartime record, and much of the rest of the older generation compromised by 
their poor pre-war record. The remaining elites were more homogeneous than 
at any time in France’s recent history, and had in addition the common bond of 
affiliation with or participation in the movements that had fought for national 
liberation. No doubt the historical circumstances of the period were particular 
to France. But a major lesson to be drawn is that the unanimity of national 
elites on the existence of the nation is a vital component of successful nation-
building. Cultural and intellectual resources are then deployed to reinforce and 
implement this underlying choice.
A principle cultural resource is the language used to characterise a situation. 
Its power is exemplified by the manner in which the concept of ‘liberation’ 
was adopted to characterise the period. One of the most urgent tasks for the 
immediate aftermath of the conflict was to find a common language with which 
to articulate the experience of the present and of the immediate past. Very 
rapidly, all parts of French society came to agree with the Resistance and the 
Free French movements, that what was happening was a liberation. Those who 
saw it differently, for the most part sympathizers with German collaboration 
or with Vichy, were constrained to silence or at least to a discreet cynicism. 
Before long the Liberation became the canonical French name for the entire 
period and implicitly described all the events leading up to and following the 
end of the war.4 The Liberation was a self-conscious starting point for a new 
era, and became a myth and milestone in the narration of French history. 
Within this agreed framework, a rich lexicon developed to express the nuances 
of interpretation and aspiration held by different groups. Revolution, rebirth, 
rebuilding  and  modernization  all  had  their  advocates,  and  each  encoded  a 
different concept of the past and future. Liberation meant many different 
things. However, once there was agreement on the most important concept, 
that the nation had been liberated, disagreements on secondary issues were 
contained and became productive. 
The French elites were not wholly free agents in achieving their aspirations. The 
presence of British and American troops on French territory was a tacit reminder 
that the French elites were acting under licence. De Gaulle was painfully aware 
that Eisenhower had only abandoned at the last minute his plan to establish 
an Allied Military Government of Occupied Territories (AMGOT) in France, akin 
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to that which was later established in Germany. American recognition for the 
Provisional Government was also slow to be granted. In some respects this lurking 
threat may have served to strengthen support for the government. While de 
Gaulle was adroit in placing his cadre of administrators in liberated areas, the 
allied authorities were also pragmatic in allowing it to happen. None of this was 
inevitable, especially with Roosevelt’s deep suspicions about de Gaulle and the 
possibility of a communist insurgency. But with hindsight, it was a key factor 
in avoiding civil war and securing a successful post-war recovery. De Gaulle’s 
particular role in this has frequently been analysed, and there is no doubt that 
his personal qualities and political skills were an important factor.5 However, it 
should be remembered that his leadership of the provisional government lasted 
less than two years. He was a focus for national unity but not its creator, and 
the unity survived his precipitate departure in January 1946.
The nation and symbolic violence
Once the fundamental agreement was secure, the French elites did not need 
to fear high levels of discord on other issues. On the contrary, internal conflicts 
may have served to strengthen national identity as different groups contended 
for a greater degree of influence over the nation’s future. Bourdieu’s notion 
of symbolic violence helps to clarify this process.6 He argues that the strength 
of a whole social field can be increased by the struggles that are waged within 
it, since the field itself is the source of the recognition and distinction that 
are at stake in the struggles. He further shows that when the field is seen as 
being under threat, the dominated groups within it are likely to cooperate in 
reinforcing the position of the dominant group as a means of strengthening the 
field as a whole. This point is demonstrated in the subordination of class and 
gender identities to the overriding national imperative. 
The  imperative  of  nation  building  in  France  had  the  immediate  effect  of 
subordinating class interests to the common task. The working class and the 
intellectuals, in particular, had strong traditions of independence. The workers 
were often bitterly opposed to the national ruling elites, while writers and 
artists typically set a high value on a prior commitment to their vocation. In 
France during the period after 1944, they both accepted the overriding priority 
of the nation, and swallowed their deep-seated reservations. They became 
part of an implicit ‘union sacrée’, which placed the national interest above 
sectional interests, at least for the period of immediate need. They accepted 
a process of symbolic violence, in which their national commitment increased 
their own subordination within the nation. At this stage, the ruling political and 
economic elites within France were not clearly identified as a dominant group. 
In 1947 and later, when political and economic conflicts resurfaced, and the 
dominant interest groups were exposed more clearly, the national imperative 
proved sufficiently entrenched to contain the internal social divisions. It might 
therefore be concluded that a likely condition and cost of nation building is the 
long-term subordination of dominated classes and professional groups.
In a similar way, gender roles were also subjected to the symbolic violence of 
nation building. The end of the war reinforced male domination as an integral 
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part of French national identity, despite the extension of voting rights to French 
women. It appeared that the urgent rebuilding of the French state required 
a  proportionately  urgent  reaffirmation  of  male  supremacy.  The  nation  was 
symbolically represented by the figure of Marianne in her various embodiments, 
but the work of building the nation was reserved for men. This was demonstrated 
by the ritual punishment of women suspected of collaboration.7 In all parts of 
France, these women had their hair shaven or cropped by men, usually under 
official auspices, fixing their guilt firmly to their sexuality, regardless of the 
nature of their offence. This coincided with a movement to confine women 
to the private, domestic sector, under the cover of a humanist ideology that 
reasserted masculinity as the standard and model of humankind. In accordance 
with the ‘rules of the game’ of symbolic violence, women largely accepted 
their  subordination  in  the  national  interest;  though  its  ferocity  sparked  a 
feminist reaction in Simone de Beauvoir, whose book Le deuxième sexe (1949) 
sprang from the experience. It is perhaps a dismal lesson that the process of 
nation building has the potential cost of reinforcing male domination, and that 
national liberation may be bought at the expense of women’s freedoms. 
Cultural bricolage
The French elites did not begin their cultural reinvention with a blank sheet. 
On the contrary, they had a rich and diverse cultural heritage to draw on. 
Much of it was damaged or compromised, but they carried out a work of what 
Claude Lévi-Strauss later called ‘bricolage’. In the spirit of ‘do-it-yourself’ and 
the ‘système-D’, they constructed workable meanings from rough and ready 
assemblages of existing materials.8  In the process they were able to juxtapose 
elements  that  had  previously  been  incompatible,  especially  the  symbols  of 
state and religion, in order to serve an immediate purpose. They were also 
able to nurture cultural traditions that had previously been marginal. The new 
intellectual movements of the post-war period, for example, all had some roots 
in pre-war culture, but were enabled to rise rapidly to a position of cultural 
dominance. This suggests the lesson that building a nation necessarily takes 
place on a ‘brown-field site’, rather than a ‘green-field site’. There are always 
previously existing materials and they provide valuable building materials, at 
least in the short-term and perhaps also in the longer term.
 
Among the most important building materials for the reinvented nation were its 
symbols. Charles de Gaulle was a consummate manipulator of symbolic speech 
and action, and constructed himself as the symbolic incarnation of France. He 
was conscious that in many respects he had little more than symbolic resources 
to draw on, but recognised that a certain gesture, a turn of phrase or a tone 
of  voice  could  exercise  more  power  than  the  administrative  and  military 
means, which were so painfully lacking. The symbols of the French state were 
themselves seriously damaged, so that de Gaulle and the political and cultural 
elites around him were obliged to draw on other symbolic systems, especially 
those  of  Catholicism.  Christian  symbols  were  similarly  damaged  but  were 
sufficiently operational to provide at least temporary support, and were drawn 
on unhesitatingly by nation builders across the political spectrum. This tactic 
was explicitly endorsed by the communist poet Louis Aragon, who argued on 
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behalf of myths: ‘les mythes remis sur leurs pieds ont force non seulement de 
faire rêver, mais de faire agir.’9 It may be a useful lesson that, when the dangers 
are immediate, symbolic alliances may be required that in other circumstances 
would be unthinkable. It is a consequence of this that alliances forged in the heat 
of necessity may prove remarkably durable. The role of religion in contributing 
symbolic resources to nation building was not specific to France, and has clear 
resonances in more recent conflicts.
The rebuilding of the nation was facilitated by a general agreement on shared 
values. No religious or secular ideology offered an acceptable basis for this. 
As a result, a process of intellectual bricolage brought the moral framework 
of humanism together to create an agreed space for argument and debate. 
Assembled from disparate elements of pre-war thinking and the universalistic 
aspirations  of  the  Resistance  movement,  it  was  promoted  by  Christian 
democrats and social democrats, and secured the assent of most other currents 
of thought. It proved an inclusive framework and rapidly became a ‘doxa’, in 
Bourdieu’s sense, expressing the common wisdom of the nation and defining the 
boundaries of what could be thought and said. Once established, this eclectic 
value system exercised a discreet hegemony in France for many years, rarely 
examined directly, but providing the underlying assumptions of the Republic. 
The debates around the nature of humanism in 1945-6 may reflect the fact that 
nation building requires an agreed value system. If there is no widely accepted 
system, such as a shared religion, then a more general system may need to be 
constructed, as it was in France, from the ideological materials to hand.
Within the broad framework of humanism, there was broad scope for a battle 
of  ideas.  Three  dynamic  and  innovative  intellectual  movements  emerged 
in  France  in  the  post  war  period:  Existentialism,  Catholic  personalism  and 
Marxism. They were developed by a younger generation of thinkers, who took 
advantage of the relative intellectual vacuum created by the war, and built 
energetic  schools  of  thought.  Each  offered  a  largely  new  philosophy,  built 
on long-standing intellectual currents of French and European thought that 
had previously struggled on the margins of cultural life. They offered moral 
and political guidance that engaged with the difficult issues of the time, and 
attracted  strong  commitment  from  a  wide  intellectual  and  cultural  milieu. 
Existentialism emerged as the culturally dominant movement, but the other 
movements strongly and at times vehemently contested it. The intensity of 
the competition between them contributed to raising the level of debate, and 
generated both a high level of philosophical culture in the country and a wider 
reputation for France as a leading international focus for new ideas and debate. 
While the intellectual effervescence was a particular feature of France, there 
may be lessons that the rebuilding of a national culture can be strengthened 
by intellectual debate. Perhaps also that in the aftermath of conflict, when 
previously dominant cultural forms have been swept away or damaged, there 
are opportunities to develop new intellectual and cultural movements.
The unburied corpse
With all its ambiguities, France did succeed in re-establishing a sense of national 
identity. The French people addressed their post-war problems with what in 
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the circumstances must be regarded as a remarkable degree of national unity. 
However, there was a price to be paid for the pragmatic sinking of differences, 
and  the  amalgamation  of  disparate  symbolic  systems.  The  re-established 
national identity bore the marks of its provisional and ambiguous beginnings. 
It was made with symbols that still carried uncomfortable connotations, and 
narratives that still lacked closure. This was already tangible in the summer 
of 1945, as the Second World War finally ended. The rejoicing was distinctly 
muted, and Sartre observed of the VE Day celebrations: ‘on avait dit aux gens 
de pavoiser: ils ne l’ont pas fait, la guerre a pris fin dans l’indifférence et dans 
l’angoisse.’10  In some respects, it was not felt to be their victory, and did not 
bring the sense of final triumph that was felt, for example, in Britain. Even de 
Gaulle, more upbeat about the occasion, commented in his memoirs:
Et puis, l’épreuve, si elle fut marquée, pour nous Français, par une gloire tirée 
du plus profond de l’abîme, n’en a pas moins comporté, d’abord, des défaillances 
désastreuses. Avec la satisfaction causée par le dénouement, elle laisse, - c’est pour 
toujours – une douleur sourde au fond de la conscience nationale. 11
The disastrous weaknesses in question primarily included the acts and policies 
of Vichy and the collaboration. From de Gaulle’s point of view they also included 
the deep divisions between political parties and intellectual traditions. The dull 
pain was the lasting, though contained, impression that these left. For Simone 
de Beauvoir, writing later in her autobiography:
La guerre était fini : elle nous restait sur les bras comme un grand cadavre encombrant, 
et il n’y avait nulle place au monde où l’enterrer. 12
Although the war was formally ended in 1945, it had already been symbolically 
ended for France in 1944. But that earlier end had been as much an end to 
the French civil war as to the German occupation. Consequently the defeat 
of Germany did not provide a narrative closure, and perhaps served more to 
emphasize the ambiguity of the victory, which had nonetheless to be celebrated. 
Beauvoir’s unburied corpse is in essence the same as de Gaulle’s dull pain in the 
national consciousness, and corresponds to a deep-seated ambiguity in French 
national identity.
The extent of French complicity in collaboration with the German occupation, 
and in its repressions and atrocities, is a historically unresolved issue, which has 
flared into life with extraordinary regularity in France, to the extent of appearing 
as a pathological disorder, which Henri Rousso has called the ‘syndrôme de 
Vichy’. 13 It is characterised by acrimonious quarrels and alternating rhythms of 
affirming and denying the importance of the occupation and its interpretation. 
Undoubtedly, as Rousso argues, each crisis in which France has been divided is 
sedimented on preceding ones, so that the ‘Franco-French war’ has developed 
a self-propelling momentum, from the Revolution to the Dreyfus Case and on 
to the Occupation, all of which have resurfaced intermittently in more recent 
contentions. However, this long-standing internecine struggle took a new turn 
after 1944, which gave it a particular visibility. On the one hand, there was virtual 
unanimity over the need for national unity, and for its powerful expression in 98
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a reconstructed national identity. This was successfully achieved by deploying 
the symbolic resources of language, religion and culture to supplement the 
weakened images of the state itself. On the other hand, the new republican 
state and its accompanying national identity became the only political and 
cultural fields within which the traditionally conflicting forces in French society 
could find expression. 
Previous generations in France, on the Left or the Right, had variously looked 
to  a  change  of  regime,  whether  by  revolution,  restoration  or  coup  d’état. 
The conflicts pitted Royalists against the Republics, Republicans against the 
Monarchies  and  Empires,  fascists  against  parliamentary  democracy,  and 
communists against the capitalist state. Now for perhaps the first time in two 
centuries there was no available cultural identity or political project outside the 
existing regime. The result of this containment was to focus divisions internally. 
The smaller space inevitably raised the temperature. Moreover, the heightened 
role of cultural construction, and its ‘nationalisation’, meant that the conflicts 
contained within national identity were exhibited to the French and to the rest 
of the world with a particular prominence through the development of post-
war French culture. In this way, in proportion as the reconstructed national 
identity dampened fundamental conflicts, the energy from those conflicts was 
transferred to the cultural realm. There, the struggle to articulate and reconcile 
the resulting ambiguities nourished the effervescence of a combative cultural 
and intellectual industry. And its participants drew additional confidence from 
the implicit awareness that they bore the responsibility of representing the 
nation, to itself and to others.
In some respects, the post war rebuilding of French national identity was a 
synthesis in the Hegelian sense. It was achieved by superseding internal conflicts 
and contradictions, but without abolishing them. And the more strongly the 
internal conflicts raged, the more strongly the overriding national identity was 
reaffirmed. There are both opportunities and costs in this dialectic of unity 
and struggle. A secure national synthesis provides opportunities for groups and 
movements to contend with one another for dominance within it. But it exacts 
a cost in subordinating the demands of other identities, especially those of 
class and gender, to the dominant forces in the national society. The powerful 
consensus to rebuild a new national identity in 1944-7 helped to secure the 
future for a free and prosperous post-war France. It placed a cordon sanitaire 
round those parts of its wartime experience that could not be integrated into 
the new identity, it helped to entrench a state of social dominance in class 
and gender relations, and it set cultural and intellectual life at the heart of 
national identity. In the process, it has provided a cultural arena within which 
the French political and cultural elites return continually to re-examine their 
country’s  wartime  experience  and  its  struggles  of  class  and  gender,  to  the 
endless fascination and instruction of observers in other countries.
The  aftermath  of  the  Second  World  War  provided  the  French  political  and 
intellectual  elites with the  opportunity for a new beginning. The country’s 
cultural and intellectual heritage was badly damaged by the conflict. In that 
respect it resembled the material infrastructure of buildings, bridges, roads 99
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and railways, which suffered destruction on a massive scale, and the political 
institutions, which had collapsed for a first time in the spring of 1940 and for 
a second time in the spring of 1944. Emerging from a succession of foreign 
military interventions, the French elites took ownership of regime change and 
launched an urgent programme of nation building, in which the cultural and 
intellectual rebuilding of French national identity played a key role. The way in 
which they rebuilt their nation was particular to the circumstances of France 
in 1944-47, but the success with which they achieved it surely holds lessons for 
other countries in the present day, where embattled national elites confront 
the strategic task of building or rebuilding a nation after conflict and regime 
change. 
Notes
1 The findings on which this analysis is based are discussed in detail in my book: (Kelly 2004).
2 See Beauvoir (1960 : 688).
3 For a contemporary account, see Aron (1945). See also Elgey (1965).
4 See for example: Azéma (1979); Kedward and Wood (1995).
5 See Cook (1984); Jackson (1990); Shennan (1993); Andrieu, Braud, and Piketty (2006).
6 See Bourdieu (1991).
7 See Brossat (1993); Virgili (2000).
8 ‘Bricolage’ corresponds closely to the British concept of amateur ‘do-it-yourself’ manual building 
work. It was popularised by the anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss to describe the use of available 
materials to create artifacts with new cultural meanings. See Lévi-Strauss (1962). ‘Système D’ is an 
expression widely used in the 1940s to describe resourceful improvisations of any kind to overcome 
shortages, thought to be derived from ‘débrouillard’.
9 (Aragon 1944 : 95)
10 (Sartre 1949 : 63) 
11 (De Gaulle 1959 : 178). 
12 (Beauvoir 1963 : 50-51). 
13 See Rousso (1990). 
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